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STANDARD OF PROOF, PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, AND
PLEA BARGAINING: HOW WRONGFUL CONVICTION DATA
EXPOSES INADEQUATE PRE-TRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
DR. ROBERT SCHEHR *
ABSTRACT
This article addresses two fundamental principles directly affecting
plea convictions – the standard of proof required for indictment, and
the presumption of innocence. In grand jury states, prosecutors procure
indictments with ease. This, accompanied by the lack of a robust pretrial presumption of innocence, increases the likelihood of wrongful
conviction. Therefore, it is my opinion that in order to maintain justice
for an accused, contemporary criminal procedure must return to the
proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard to indict. It is for precisely
these reasons that this standard was originally adopted by our nation’s
founding judges. Concerns about prosecutorial overreach that were
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common at the founding of our American judicial system were primarily
driven by prior experiences with England. Today, we see the
manifestation of these concerns as legal and social science scholars
have generated comprehensive assessments of the correlates
generating wrongful convictions of actually innocent men and women.
Plea bargaining has become an important instrument of state
authority necessary to efficiently process felony criminal cases.
However, given its hegemonic ubiquity throughout the system, it is
apparent to me that the failure of both Supreme Court case law, and
Congressionally generated federal rules legitimating pleas has given
rise to a shadow administration of justice. Therefore, it is not difficult
to conclude that the sleight of hand remains the presumption of guilt
from arrest through indictment. This is in spite of our nation’s tendency
to valorize a system of due process that affords protection of rights
accruing to defendants who elect to plead not guilty and go to trial, and
the opaque exercise of prosecutorial authority that constitutes 95 to 97
percent of all felony convictions procured through plea bargaining.
Viewed in this context, Federal Rule 11 – with its “rational” colloquy
ostensibly designed to assure the court and serve as a palliative to the
public that a defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily,
in addition to the requirement that pleas must possess a “factual basis”
(never yet clearly defined by either a court or the United States
Congress) – is a tissue-thin cloak to legitimate what is otherwise a
severe usurpation of the protection of liberty interests that are
paramount to a democracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a strongly worded 177-page opinion, Federal District Court
Judge, William G. Young, said, “The focus of our entire criminal justice
system has shifted away from trials and juries and adjudication to a
massive system of sentence bargaining that is heavily rigged against the
accused citizen.” 1 Because we now have a criminal justice system that
is largely constituted by plea bargaining, in essence “Americans are
bargaining away their innocence.” 2 How did this happen?
At least four important events merged in the 1970s to bowtie plea
bargaining, thereby virtually insulating it from constitutional
challenges. These four events were: (1) the last of the decade’s Supreme
Court jurisprudence addressing the constitutionality of plea
bargaining; 3 (2) incorporation of the probable cause standard of proof
for indictment at both the state and federal levels; 4 (3) the Supreme
Court’s limiting the presumption of innocence to trial; 5 and (4) the 1975
Amendment to Rule 32(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Rule 32 (a)(2) (now Rule 32 (c)(5)) was amended in 1975
to say, “Proposed subdivision (a)(2) provides that the court is not
dutybound to advise the defendant of a right to appeal when the
sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.” 6
________________________________
1.
Adam Liptak, Federal Law on Sentencing is Unjust, Judge Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/23/us/federal-law-onsentencing-is-unjust-judge-rules.html.
2. Tim Lynch, Americans are Bargaining Away their Innocence, WASH. POST
(Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory.wp.2016/01/20/
americans -are-bargaining-away-their-innocence/.
3. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 362–65 (1978).
4. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MODEL GRAND JURY
CHARGE ¶ 25 (Mar. 2005), http://cldc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/model-gjcharge.pdf.
5. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
6. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2) (emphasis added). Rule 32 was amended in 1994,
and the section pertaining to the responsibility of judges to advise defendants of their
right to appeal following a guilty plea is now Rule 32(c)(5). The language in the notes
to the 1994 amendment is unchanged: “Subdivision (c)(5), concerning notification of
the right to appeal, was formerly included in subdivision (a)(2). Although the
provision has been rewritten, the Committee intends no substantive change in practice.
That is, the court may, but is not required to, advise a defendant who has entered a
guilty plea, nolo contendere plea or a conditional guilty plea of any right to appeal
(such as an appeal challenging jurisdiction). However, the duty to advise the
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A strong argument can be made that the Supreme Court and various
legislative bodies addressed these four matters in a coordinated way to
significantly limit the potential for constitutional challenges to pleas. 7
With the exception of the Court’s plea jurisprudence (which I have
already addressed in a previous article confronting the constitutionality
of pleas) 8 and the language specifying a judge’s responsibility under
Rule 32, I will examine both the evolution and prudence of the probable
cause standard to indict, and the limitation of the presumption of
innocence to trial. Each represents a matter of pressing concern.
The purpose of this article is to advance questions seemingly so
obvious that they largely go without comment in published legal
scholarship. For example, one could ask: What is the standard of proof
required for conviction via plea bargain? When compared to the
constitutionally mandated requirement that prosecutors must meet the
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to convict at trial, does the
criminal procedure leading up to plea negotiations represent an
unconstitutional deviation both in principle and in practice? Should
there exist a pre-trial presumption of innocence? 9 In the absence of a
pre-trial presumption of innocence and with the low standard of proof
required for indictment, is it likely that a significant number of accused
but innocent suspects may be wrongfully convicted? For reasons
articulated below, I do not believe that the criminal procedure leading
up to plea negotiations satisfies the Supreme Court’s high standard for
felony conviction, because these procedures lack a presumption of
innocence. It is this presumption of guilt that generates fertile ground
________________________________
defendant in such cases extends only to advice on the right to appeal any sentence
imposed” (emphasis added).
7. During the 1970s, legislative initiatives generated new categories of crime,
and most important, enhanced sentencing. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012);
MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT (2015); NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT:
HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE
OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011).
8. See generally Robert Schehr, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual
Dishonesty and the Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 2 TEX. A&M L. REV. 385
(2015).
9. G.P. Garrett, False Presumptions Counter to the Presumptions of Innocence,
J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 851, 853 (1917) (“Presumptions, in and of
themselves, contain no virtue and no vice. Justly drawn, they are advantageous, useful
and inevitable. Wrongly drawn, they are mere insubstantial illusions.”).
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for law enforcement and prosecutors to procure convictions via grand
jury indictments where only probable cause is the standard of proof to
indict.
To convincingly develop my argument, I am going to request that
my readers suspend their disbelief. Since the 1970s, plea bargaining has
become so ubiquitous that much about its procedure has attained an
essentialist quality that takes for granted the requisite standard of proof
in criminal cases. At issue in this article is whether it is conceptually
and procedurally efficacious to frame plea bargaining within the
context of standards of evidence sufficiency, also referred to as
“standards of proof.” When taken together, institutional rationales and
the implementation of plea bargaining have been established as legal
norms reaching hegemonic status. That is, nearly all criminal justice
practitioners, as well as victims and offenders, view the
institutionalization of plea bargaining as an immutable matter of fact. 10
Whether it serves systematic efficiency interests by saving resources,
or by dispensing justice with greater speed and efficiency, plea
bargaining exists for all actors as the normative mechanism through
which felony cases are prosecuted. I quite intentionally invoke Antonio
Gramsci’s 11 conceptualization of hegemony to introduce a theoretical
level of complexity. In doing so, I hope this will move our discussion
away from one that is exclusively doctrinal and internal to
administrators of justice in order to locate plea practice in a systemreproducing context. Specifically, Gramsci defines social hegemony as
possessing two aspects:
1. The “spontaneous” consent given by the great masses of the
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the
dominant fundamental group; this consent is “historically” caused by
the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group
enjoys because of its position and function in the world of
production.
________________________________
10. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (“The disposition of
criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor and the accused, sometimes
loosely called ‘plea bargaining,’ is an essential component of the administration of
justice.”).
11. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Communist Party leader who died in prison
after being arrested for speaking out against fascism during the early twentieth
century. Antonio Gramsci Biography, BIOGRAPHY.COM, http://www.biography.com/
people/antonio-gramsci-9317929.
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2. The apparatus of state coercive power which “legally” enforces
discipline on those groups who do not “consent” either actively or
passively. This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of
society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and
direction when spontaneous consent has failed. 12

Colloquially, we may define hegemony as rule by consent, backed
up by the threat of coercion. Actions taken by the Supreme Court,
Congress, and the Judicial Conference in the 1970s, as they pertained
to setting the foundation for plea bargaining, have generated consent
from bureaucratic actors administering justice (e.g., law enforcement,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges), defendants, and from the public
more generally. Invoking the concept of hegemony tips my hand as one
who views the proliferation of plea bargaining as being on par with
enhanced social control. 13 After all, plea bargaining takes place in
private, requires renunciation of fundamental rights protections, 14 and
proceeds following indictment based upon the second lowest standard
of proof. 15 Included is the fact that when presenting evidence before a
grand jury, prosecutors need not concern themselves with Federal Rules
of Evidence nor the presentation of exculpatory evidence and can
reconvene a grand jury as frequently as necessary until finally procuring
an indictment. 16 What emerges is a portrait of state power that bears a
________________________________
12. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 12 (1971).
13. My emphasis upon plea bargaining as social control is clearly antithetical
to both the resource efficiency and mutual benefit claims established by the United
States Supreme Court. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Bordenkircher
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); Chaffin v. Synchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973);
Santabello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970); North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970); Parker v. North Carolina, 397
U.S. 790 (1970).
14. Plea bargaining requires the waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights,
with the exception of the right to counsel. Plea Bargain, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/plea_bargain (last visited Nov. 14, 2017).
15. See infra Figure 1.
16. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.; see also Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 261 (1995); Kevin
K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2346 (2008).
For relevant case law, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1743–44
(1992) (federal appellate courts may not exercise supervisory power to dismiss an
otherwise valid indictment because of the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–50 (1974)
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striking resemblance to the fifteenth-century Star Chamber; 17 hardly the
epitome of due process in a democracy. Viewing pleas through the lens
of hegemony, a taken-for-granted normative acceptance of an
undernourished system of due process emerges where public consent
has been manufactured through a series of significant legal and political
maneuvers. Furthermore, we cannot forget the potential threat of
coercion should a defendant reject the plea and elect to pursue trial. This
threat is leveraged by the fact that that the defendant will confront a
“trial tax” 18 if convicted and as a consequence, suffer a far graver
punishment. 19 With this in mind, plea bargaining then manifests as a
________________________________
(refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to grand juries); Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956) (indictment not subject to challenge on grounds it was based
on hearsay).
17.
While there are qualitative differences, the similarities between
contemporary plea negotiations and the Star Chamber are too recognizable to resist.
The Star Chamber was established in 1487 by King Henry VII. The name, Star
Chamber, is based upon the star-painted ceiling of the room at Westminster Palace
where the court sat. Beginning with the reigns of James I (1603–25) and Charles I
(1625–49), the Star Chamber became increasingly oppressive. Star Chamber, THE
FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Star+Chamber (last
visited Nov. 14, 2017). According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the Star Chamber was
“[a]n English Court having broad civil and criminal jurisdiction at the king’s
discretion and noted for its secretive, arbitrary, and oppressive procedures, including
compulsory self-incrimination, inquisitorial investigation, and the absence of juries.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (7th ed. 1999) [hereinafter BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY].
18. “Trial tax” is the colloquial reference to the difference between a sentence
offered to a defendant in a plea deal and what the defendant may expect to receive if
convicted at trial. As a matter of right, all felony defendants may exercise their Sixth
Amendment right to trial. However, to discourage exercise of that right via guilty
pleas, courts give defendants far more severe sentences if they go to trial and are found
guilty. For more information on the trial tax, see Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial
Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1082–83 (1976).
A 2015 analysis found that federal defendants who exercised their right to trial and
were found guilty experienced a sixty-four percent sentencing enhancement. Andrew
Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Analysis of the
Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1200
(2015).
19. To be clear, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that neither plea
bargaining alone, nor the threat of significantly harsher sentences upon conviction at
trial, amounts to coercion. In one case, the Supreme Court held, “To punish a person
because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation
of the most basic sort . . . . But in the ‘give-and-take’ of plea bargaining there is no
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“legal-rational” 20 mode of hegemonic state power. 21 Recognition of this
fact appears in European human rights law where plea bargaining in
exchange for downward departures in sentencing “may violate the
presumption of innocence” because the incentive of a reduced sentence
may be at odds with the presumption. 22 As my argument develops in
the following pages, it will be helpful to keep this emphasis on
hegemony in mind.
Since the 1970s, the scales have tipped heavily in the direction of
pleas following indictment as opposed to establishing proof beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial before triers of fact. Given the pervasiveness
of plea bargaining, we must step back and deconstruct existing criminal
procedure leading to indictment prior to commencement of plea
negotiations. This will allow us to discern whether the standard of
proof, upon which rests determination of the quantum of proof
necessary to indict, is a signifier that is comprehensive enough to
generate a conviction in a criminal case.
II. STANDARD OF PROOF
A standard of proof is “the level of persuasion required in court to
be able to reach a judicial verdict.” 23 There are eight standards of
evidence proficiency, also referred to as standards of proof. 24 Standards
range from the minimum amount of evidence required—none or
________________________________
such element of punishment or retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or
reject the prosecution’s offer.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). I
will not pursue the Court’s emphasis on the contractual nature of plea bargaining, as
I have already done so elsewhere. See Schehr, supra note 8, at 391.
20. Legal-Rational authority was theorized by German sociologist Max Weber
to mean three principal things: (1) law is rational to the extent that decisions are based
upon existing unambiguous rules; (2) law is formal to the degree that the standards
used for arriving at a decision are internal to the legal system (autopoiesis); and (3)
law is logical to the degree that rules are the product of conscious construction through
syllogistic reasoning. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 217 (1978).
21. See id.
22. See Andrew Ashworth, Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence, 123
S. AFRICAN L.J. 63, 80 (2006).
23. Thomas Christopher Rider, What is the Most Useful Standard of Proof in
Criminal Law?, PRAGMATISM TOMORROW, 2013, at 1, 1.
24.
See MARVIN ZALMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTION AND
SOCIETY 139 (Pearson Prentice Hall, 5th ed. 2008).
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“mere” suspicion (also referred to in Common Law as “scintilla of
evidence”)—to that requiring virtually no doubt about the facts alleged
and the defendant’s culpability i.e., proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Table 1: Standards of Evidence Sufficiency 25
STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENCY—ALL
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
Clear and convincing evidence
Preponderance of the evidence
Prima facie case
Substantial evidence on the whole
record
Probable cause
Reasonable suspicion
None or “mere” suspicion

STANDARDS OF EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENCY—CRIMINAL
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt

Probable cause
Reasonable suspicion

We can visually represent the standard of proof using the pyramid chart
(Figure 1) below, 26 where the quantum of evidence increases as we
move from bottom to top.
In criminal cases, we typically apply only the reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt standards. Figure
1 below attempts to visually demonstrate, from bottom to top, the
increasingly rigorous standards of evidence-sufficiency applied in
criminal cases. 27 Starting from the bottom, the lowest standard of proof
depicted in the pyramid is reasonable suspicion, which pertains to a
“particularized and objective basis, supported by articulable facts, for
suspecting a person of criminal activity.” 28 It is the first level of proof
required by police officers to justify Fourth Amendment search and
seizure, as clarified in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Terry v. Ohio.29
Requiring more than a hunch, reasonable suspicion demands a “totality
of the circumstances” assessment that considers the experience and

________________________________
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
See infra Figure 1.
See id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1273.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1868, 1885 (1968).
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expertise of police officers, the reliability of informants, and the
probability that a crime may be in progress or previously occurred. 30
Figure 1: Standards of Proof
Proof beyond a
reasonable
doubt

Preponderance
of the evidence
Probable Cause
Reasonable Suspicion
Moving up the pyramid, with a modicum of enhanced sufficiency
of evidence over reasonable suspicion is probable cause. Probable cause
is defined as:
A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is
committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected
with a crime. Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause – which
amounts to more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that
would justify a conviction – must be shown before an arrest warrant
or search warrant may be issued.31

Probable cause is the standard of proof necessary to make an arrest,
and to indict a defendant before a grand jury. 32
Unlike the two standards of proof previously discussed,
preponderance of the evidence is not a standard of proof applied in
criminal cases. Rather, it is used in civil trials and requires meeting a
standard of proof that is “the greater weight of the evidence.” 33 It is
________________________________
30.
31.
32.
33.

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17.
Id. at 977.
See State v. Atwood, 301 P.3d 1255, 1260 (2013).
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1201.
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evidence that while insufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, “is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side
of the issue” over the other. 34
The most stringent of the standards of proof is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. Model Penal Code section 1.12(1) establishes that in
criminal proceedings, “[n]o person may be convicted of an offense
unless each element of such offense is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In the absence of such proof, the innocence of the defendant is
assumed.” 35 And while the definition and interpretation of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt avoids precision, we may agree that it is,
“[t]he standard that must be met by the prosecution’s evidence in a
criminal prosecution: that no other logical explanation can be derived
from the facts except that the defendant committed the crime, thereby
overcoming the presumption that a person is innocent until proven
guilty.” 36 Why is this important?
In their dissenting opinion in the 1952 case of Leland v. Oregon, 37
Justices Frankfurter and Black emphasize the probity of the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard:
[F]rom the time that the law which we have inherited has emerged
from dark and barbaric times, the conception of justice which has
dominated our criminal law has refused to put an accused at the
hazard of punishment if he fails to remove every reasonable doubt of
his innocence in the minds of jurors. It is the duty of the Government
to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This notion – basic
in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society – is a
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic,
procedural content of ‘due process.’38

In In re Winship, 39 the United States Supreme Court upheld proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as the standard necessary for procuring a
criminal conviction.
________________________________
34. Id.
35. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2016).
36.
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Beyond+a+Reasonable+Doubt (last visited Mar. 5,
2017).
37. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802–03 (1952).
38. Id.
39. 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
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The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years
as a Nation. The “demand for a higher degree of persuasion in
criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient times,
(though) its crystallization into the formula ‘beyond a reasonable
doubt’ seems to have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in
common law jurisdictions as the measure of persuasion by which the
prosecution must convince the trier of all the essential elements of
guilt.” 40

The Court continues by reiterating the significance of the “proof
beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to “[reduce] the risk of
convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete
substance for the presumption of innocence – that bedrock ‘axiomatic
and elementary’ principle whose ‘enforcement lies at the foundation of
the administration of our criminal law.’” 41 Still, for my purposes the
most impactful statement from the Court comes from the dissenters in
an earlier New York Court of Appeals case:
[A] person accused of a crime . . . would be at a severe disadvantage,
a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he
could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of
the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case [preponderance of
the evidence] (emphasis added). 42

Returning for a moment to both Table 1 and Figure 1, conviction
based upon a standard of proof required in a civil case—preponderance
of the evidence—is a far lower hurdle to overcome than the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard applied to criminal convictions.43
That means that the amount of certainty required to establish guilt is far
less stringent in civil than in criminal cases. This is because damages
resulting from civil convictions are primarily monetary and do not
include the loss of liberty or the degree of public shaming, damage to
reputation, loss of family and friends, loss of work, and the like, which
generally transpire from a criminal conviction. Furthermore, the
Winship majority proclaimed that, “[i]t is critical that the moral force of
________________________________
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id. at 363.
Id. (quoting W. v. Family Court, 24 N.Y.2d 196, 205 (1969)).
See supra Table 1 & Figure 1.
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the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people
in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.” 44 Before turning
its attention to application of the proof beyond a reasonable doubt
standard to juvenile defendants, the Court affirmed the constitutionality
of the standard: “we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.” 45 The conclusion cannot be more clear: in criminal cases
where the loss of personal liberty and resources are at stake, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires the state to bear
the burden of proving each element of its case beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The Supreme Court’s articulation of the proof beyond a reasonable
doubt standard for criminal convictions is laudable for its emphasis on
the presumption of innocence and the magnitude of evidence required
before the accused may suffer loss of liberty. However, it is now widely
known that at both the state and federal levels only about five percent
of criminal cases will proceed to trial, with 95 to 97 percent of cases
being resolved via plea bargains. 46 Despite the fact that defendants who
plead guilty may suffer the same negative effects as those who are
convicted at trial, the state is not required to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt in the plea bargain context. Rather, plea bargains
commence upon indictment, often followed by presentment before a
grand jury. 47
________________________________
44. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.
45. Id.
46. “Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of
state convictions result from guilty pleas.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 U.S. 156, 170 (2012)
(citing Missouri v. Frye, 132 U.S. 134, 143 (2012)).
47. According to Wayne LaFave et al., there are 18 states that require an
indictment for most felonies: Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Maine,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. WAYNE
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 775 (5th ed. 2009). In addition to the states
identified by LaFave et al., the National Center for State Courts includes: District of
Columbia, Guam, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. Grand Jury Statutes and Rules, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS.,
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Jury/Grand-Juries/State-Links.aspx (last visited Mar. 25,
2018). The state of Arizona permits the use of a grand jury for purposes of indictment.
Reporter’s Guide to Arizona’s Legal Community, ST. BAR OF ARIZ.,
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The standard of proof required for indictment, whether it is the
product of a preliminary hearing or grand jury hearing, 48 is probable
cause. Returning to the definition of probable cause used above, “more
than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
conviction” is required. 49 Also, recall the Supreme Court in Winship
established that the constitutionally mandated burden of proof required
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—proof
beyond a reasonable doubt, along with its accompanying presumption
of innocence—applies to all criminal convictions. 50 It is appropriate to
be reminded of the extremely precise language used by the Court to
emphasize this point: “[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal
law not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned.” 51 And as indicated
above, the Court makes clear that any standard of proof falling below
proof beyond a reasonable doubt must certainly be unconstitutional.
Returning for a moment to our standard of proof pyramid, it is clear that
even the preponderance of the evidence standard typically applied in
civil trials, which requires significantly greater evidentiary weight than
probable cause, fails the Court’s constitutional test. 52 The Court in
Winship raised the evidentiary bar in its concise statement of what is
required for criminal conviction.
To summarize, there are two standards of proof required for
criminal conviction – proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and probable
cause. The proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard only applies to
________________________________
http://www.azbar.org/newsevents/mediacontact/reporterguide/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2017).
48. “Prosecutors in twenty-eight states may bring a felony charge based on a
sworn statement (information) and then may bring a charge either before a preliminary
hearing or before a grand jury.” MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 530
(2011).
49. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 1219.
50. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361.
51. Id. at 364.
52. “The preponderance of the evidence standard is satisfied if the maximum
weight of the applicable pro argument outweighs the maximum weight of the
applicable con arguments, by even a small amount of evidential weight.” Thomas F.
Gordon & Douglass Walton, A Formal Model of Legal Proof Standards and Burdens,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH INT’L CONF. OF THE INT’L. SOC’Y FOR THE STUDY OF
ARGUMENTATION, http://dougwalton.ca/papers%20in%pdf/11ISSAStndard.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2018).
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trials whereas felony criminal conviction as a result of plea bargaining
is satisfied by a probable cause determination, usually from a
preliminary hearing or grand jury proceeding. It is my contention that,
when juxtaposed with the Supreme Court’s compelling case for proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as the constitutionally mandated standard
for conviction at a criminal trial, the standard of proof required to
convict between 95 and 97 percent of criminal defendants via plea
bargaining is unconstitutional. The remainder of this article challenges
the constitutional legitimacy of convictions based upon the probable
cause standard as opposed to the more rigorous beyond a reasonable
doubt standard.
III. PLEA BARGAINS, WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, AND THE PROBABLE
CAUSE STANDARD
At the time of this writing there are 1886 exonerees listed in the
National Registry of Exoneration database, spanning from 1989 to
2016. 53 Of particular interest to this article is the number of wrongful
convictions generated as a result of the guilty plea. From 1989 to 2016
there have been a total of 276 identified cases of wrongful conviction
where the accused accepted a guilty plea but was later determined to be
innocent. 54 That amounts to a little more than fifteen-percent of the total
number of identified wrongful convictions.
Among those states that make use of grand jury indictments as their
principal charging instrument, there are 180 exonerees who originally
entered guilty pleas. 55 Table 2, 56 provided below, culls data from the
National Registry to illustrate the following three data points: (1) states
that make use of grand jury indictments as their principal charging
instrument, (2) the number of exonerees who entered into guilty pleas,
and (3) the total number of exonerations from each of the grand jury
states. Since 1989, twenty-six grand jury states collectively convicted
180 innocent people via the plea, about twenty percent of the total 895
wrongful convictions. 57
________________________________
53. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Apr. 26, 2016).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See infra Table 2.
57. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53.
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I present this particular plea exoneration data to emphasize one
significant point: in 180 cases (twenty percent of the total), innocent
people were presented with an indictment following presentment before
a grand jury where the standard of proof was probable cause. All of
these 180 people accepted the terms of a guilty plea. 58 I have argued
elsewhere that guilty pleas give rise to a significant number of wrongful
convictions. 59 Legal and social science scholars simply do not have
access to the kind of data necessary to determine which among the
felony plea convictions, comprising of 95 to 97 percent of all felony
convictions, are cases where the defendant is innocent. The National
Registry data presents us only with cases that have been identified as
wrongful convictions, but surely there are more.
A host of legal fictions have been constructed to rationalize the
constitutionality of conviction by way of plea bargain. Surely, some
reading this article will object to my juxtaposition of trial with plea
convictions as being a comparison of apples to oranges. In fact, those
critics would be correct. In the United States, we have established two
distinct mechanisms for criminal conviction: a trial that affords the
accused their constitutionally mandated due process protections, and
plea bargaining which occurs in the privacy of the prosecutor’s office.60
It is important to note the temporal aspect of the plea process. Legal
________________________________
58. There were an additional 758 wrongfully convicted people whose cases
passed through the grand jury probable cause indictment phase, but who proceeded to
trial and were erroneously convicted. Because my primary focus in this article is on
the standard of proof, presumption of innocence, and evidentiary standards leading to
an indictment by grand jury and ultimately, to the plea, I will forego assessment of
the remaining cases that proceeded to trial. However, it should be noted that these 758
cases passed through the same grand jury indictment procedure, thereby placing the
innocent accused in the position of having to choose between plea and trial. For many
reasons that have been well documented, the decision to proceed to trial is equally
fraught. See Robert Schehr & Chelsea French, Mental Competency Law and Plea
Bargaining: A Neurophenomenoligical Critique, 79 ALBANY L.R. 1091 (2016)
[hereinafter Mental Competency Law].
59. See Schehr, supra note 8.
60. These protections include the highest standard of proof and protection
provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence, which only applies to five percent of
criminal cases, and a plea bargain which occurs in the privacy of the prosecutor’s
office, and where the accused may be indicted by a grand jury that has been presented
with “evidence” that would otherwise violate the Federal Rules of Evidence were it
to be presented at trial. See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand
Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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scholars will often contend that pleas are constitutional, and that the
accused relinquishes her right to the presumption of innocence upon
admission or confession to the charges. 61 However, my concern, and
the substance of this article, is temporally sensitive. What I am
addressing is the legal process that unfolds for an accused between the
time of the defendant’s arrest and her grand jury indictment. Once the
indictment is procured, the prosecutor may advance toward negotiation
of a plea. This article contends that the unconstitutionality of the plea
process commences prior to the admission or confession where guilt is
affirmed at the plea colloquy. It seems clear that it is the confluence of
police investigation activities, pre-sentencing reports, case law,
courtroom
working
groups,
and
neurophenomenological
characteristics 62 of the accused (occurring upon arrest and ending with
________________________________
61. While not the primary purpose of this article, it is important to raise an
objection here to the certainty with which legal scholars draw this conclusion. In a
string of Supreme Court cases including Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), Lego
v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972), and Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), the
United States Supreme Court has raised concerns over the probity of relying upon
confession evidence as indicative of guilt. Specifically, in Crane Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor writing for the majority said, “Confessions, even those that have been
found to be voluntary, are not conclusive of guilt. And, as with any other part of the
prosecutor’s case, a confession may be shown to be ‘insufficiently corroborated or
otherwise . . . unworthy of belief.’” Crane, 476 U.S. at 689 (quoting Twomey, 404
U.S. at 486). Additionally, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a “factual
basis” to indict and engage in plea negotiations. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. R. 11. The
construct, factual basis, has never been objectively defined to explain precisely what
kind of evidence is necessary to meet this requirement. In most cases, there likely will
be enough evidence in the file to garner an indictment before a grand jury, whose
standard of proof to indict is probable cause. But that is a far cry from corroborating
evidence necessary to validate a so-called “knowing and voluntary” confession. Of
course, and this is the point I am addressing in this article, procedural rules directed
at preservation of safe convictions at trial are not typically applied to the plea process.
Rather than apply its sound reasoning in Crane to the plea process, the Court would
likely return to its prior positions as taken in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970) and its progeny to rely upon the contractual nature of the plea. See also Robert
E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J., 1909
(1992); Schehr, supra note 8.
62. Neurophenomenology is a theoretical construct that seeks a holistic
approach to understanding consciousness, especially with regard to decision-making.
The theory, first advanced by Francisco Varela in the late 1990s, combines the
substantive areas of neurology, neuropsychology, and phenomenology.
Neurophenomenology posits a far more nuanced assessment of human consciousness
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grand jury indictment), that directly implicate police officers,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys in an unconstitutional but
immanently efficient practice of moving cases toward rapid conviction.
Figure 2: Arrest to Pleading Continuum

Arrest

Assigned
Counsel

Formal
Chargest Initial
Appearance

Grand Jury or
Information

Indictment
via Probable
Cause

Plead Guilty
or Not Guilty

It is my contention that the confluence of the following factors all
but assure innocent men and women will be wrongfully convicted via
the plea:
(1) The low standard of proof necessary to indict (probable
cause);
(2) The absence of a pre-trial presumption of innocence;
(3) The fact that prosecutors are not bound by the Federal Rules
of Evidence—there is no evidentiary requirement that the
state presents exculpatory evidence;
(4) The absence of adversarial due process;
(5) The fact that a prosecutor may convene as many grand
juries as is necessary to procure an indictment;
(6) The fact that neurophenomenological factors heavily
influence the plea bargaining process; 63 and
(7) The prevalence of Draconian state and federal sentencing
statutes that are used by prosecutors and defense attorneys
to encourage resolution of cases via the plea.
________________________________
and decision-making and can be applied to plea bargaining. See Mental Competency
Law, supra note 58, at 1091.
63. Id.
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Equally important to the legitimacy of a democracy, as the Supreme
Court recognized in Winship, is the “moral force of the criminal law”
that must not be “diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in
doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.” 64 In Table 2, data
is culled from the National Registry of Exonerations pertaining to
exonerations occurring since 1989 in grand jury states.

________________________________
64.

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
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Table 2: Exonerations by states that use grand jury indictments as
charging instrument.
STATE 65

PLEA

Alabama
2
Alaska
1
Arizona
2
Delaware
District of Columbia 1
Georgia
4
Guam
1
Kentucky
1
Maine
Massachusetts
3
Michigan
3
Minnesota
2
North Dakota
1
New Hampshire
New Jersey
3
New York
8
North Carolina
8
Ohio
3
Oregon
2
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
2
Texas
130
Virginia
3
West Virginia
Wyoming
TOTAL
180
Probable Cause Standard of Proof

TOTAL
STATE
25
8
18
1
15
27
1
10
2
42
62
11
2
1
21
211
41
56
10
6
4
18
248
43
9
3
895

TOTAL
FEDERAL
1
3
4

1
3
3
1
1
1
11
1

1
5
5
2

43

TOTAL 66
26
8
21
1
19
27
1
11
2
45
65
12
3
1
22
222
41
57
10
6
5
23
253
45
9
3
938

________________________________
65
These states represent those that have been identified as requiring presentment
before a grand jury prior to indictment. Supra note 47.
66
At the time this article was written, there were 1886 exonerations listed as part of
the National Registry. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53. The 938
exonerations reported by state in Table 2 represent roughly 53 percent of those 1886.
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There are countless activities that people and institutions engage in
because it is what they have always done. In fact, in many ways what
constitutes being human is our frequently inconsiderate return to
habitual pathways regardless of whether they pertain to a morning
commute to work, conversations with family, friends, and colleagues,
or conventions relating to the way we eat and dress. When those habits
rise to the level of bureaucratic procedure, as in criminal due process,
they may take on superstructural hegemonic significance, ultimately
manifesting as legal-rational mechanisms for the reproduction of state
power. Such is the case with our contemporary reliance upon the
probable cause standard of proof as it applies to the presentation of
charges, at information hearings, or before a grand jury. It is doubtful
that prosecutors, defense attorneys, or judges stop to question the
bureaucratic significance of the probable cause standard, especially as
it applies to the standard necessary for obtaining an indictment at
information or grand jury proceedings. Indeed, the standard is so
ubiquitous and steeped in over fifty years of practice applied to plea
bargaining, that it has attained hegemonic status. The probable cause
standard for indictment is taken for granted by everyone who occupies
the courtroom working group. Like the presumption of innocence, the
probable cause standard is so ubiquitous that merely questioning the
prudence of the standard of proof as it pertains to criminal charges
before a grand jury, for instance, generates a quizzical look akin to
questioning whether the sun rises in the east. The practical application
of the probable cause standard of proof required for indictment, a
standard that has existed for over one-hundred years, 67 has taken on an
essentialist quality that through its proliferation over time, has
developed a deeply worn channel. The question then becomes: Is it true
that just because we have been operating on the premise that the
probable cause standard is hegemonic, must it necessarily be so?
In an article published in March of 2016 by the Stanford Law
Review, Professor William Ortman provides a thorough historical
assessment of the origins and applications of probable cause both in
England and the United States. 68 Professor Ortman’s article provides a
thorough account of the origin and evolution of probable cause,
________________________________
67. See Atwell v. United States, 162 F. 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1908).
68. See generally William Ortman, Probable Cause Revisited, 68 STAN. L.
REV. 511 (2016).
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something that this article will not entirely repeat here. However, it will
reveal some prescient insights as they may prove to be important in
assisting my claims.
As already considered, the standard of proof is an important
procedural mechanism to ensure fairness. If there were no charging
standards, a prosecutor could bring a case before a grand jury with
illegitimate evidence, or even no evidence whatsoever. Ortman
contends that, “charging standards act as a constraint on prosecutors.” 69
Accordingly, “[t]he more one ratchets up a charging standard. . . the
more confident one can be that prosecutors are constrained and that
convicted defendants are actually guilty.” 70
The probable cause standard was known to American judges and
attorneys at the time of our nation’s founding primarily through English
“Whig tracts, legal treatises, and justice of the peace manuals.” 71 It
appears that disputes arising between Whigs and Tories are what
generated intense focus on whether one could be charged and indicted
before a grand jury based upon “probabilities.” 72 The grand jury in
England originated with the creation of the Assize of Clarendon in 1166
by Henry II, 73 but little attention is given to charging standards until
Edward Coke and Matthew Hale comment on them in the midseventeenth century.
Coke and Hale represent what would emerge in the United States
as the two most prominent narratives on the subject. For Coke, an
indictment required far greater evidence of guilt than mere probability.
He contended that, “it is most necessary to have substantial proof.”74
Hale disagreed. Because a grand jury indictment did not establish guilt
once and for all and was merely an accusation, Hale argued that the
existence of “probable evidence” of guilt should be enough to return a
true bill. 75 Political power was the primary motivation for increasing
attention to the grand jury indictment process. Whigs lost power when
________________________________
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 517 n.19.
Id. at 518.
Id. at 526.
Id.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
Id.
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King Charles II dissolved the Oxford Parliament. 76 Nevertheless,
Charles went ahead and prosecuted Whigs, including two individuals
named Stephen Colledge and Anthony Ashley Cooper. 77 To prosecute
his case against Colledge and Cooper, among other Whig activists,
Charles had to first procure a grand jury indictment. 78 The first grand
jury was empaneled in London where the Whigs held power. 79 Both
men were acquitted when the “grand jury returned an ‘ignoramus,’ what
today we would call a ‘no bill.’” 80 However, Colledge was later
presented before a grand jury in Oxford, where Charles possessed
considerably greater power, and was indicted. 81
As Ortman notes, one of the most important publications
addressing the topic of grand jury indictments was Henry Care’s,
English Liberties: Or, The Freeborn Subject’s Inheritance, was first
published in the 1680s. 82 There, Care argues for a strict standard to be
required for grand jury indictment.83 According to Ortman, Care
challenged Pemberton’s “probable evidence” standard by arguing that
jurors “must be fully satisfied in their Consciences, that [the defendant]
is Guilty.” 84 Care challenged Pemberton by emphasizing the factfinding role of the grand jury. 85
The Founding generation of American judges and attorneys were
well aware of the debate taking place between Tories and Whigs over
the evidentiary standard necessary to generate an indictment before a
grand jury. From our founding through the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, judges routinely applied the stricter evidentiary
standard introduced by the Whigs. For example, the following
statement is the jury instructions given by Justice James Wilson of the
Federal Circuit Court in Pennsylvania, clearly expressing his opposition
to applying the probable cause standard to grand jury verdicts:
________________________________
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 523.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 524.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 525.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Ought not moral certainty to be deemed the necessary basis, of what
is delivered under the sanction of an obligation so solemn and so
strict [as a grand jury’s verdict]? The doctrine, that a grand jury may
rest satisfied merely with probabilities, is a doctrine, dangerous as
well as unfounded: It is a doctrine, which may be applied to
countenance and promote the vilest and most oppressive purposes: It
may be used, in pernicious rotation, as a snare, in which the innocent
may be entrapped, and as a screen, under the cover of which the
guilty may escape. 86

Echoing Wilson’s concerns, New Jersey Chief Justice James
Kinsey said: “[T]ho’ I have often heard it laid down as a rule, that
probability is a sufficient ground for you to indict a citizen, . . . [I] have
always viewed it as a principle against which reason revolts.” 87 Further,
Justice Samuel Chase went so far as to argue that the evidence
necessary to indict should be on par with evidence that would be
brought before a Petit Jury at trial: “[E]very Grand Jury, before they
find an indictment, should expect the same proof, and as satisfactory
evidence of guilt of the accused as the Petit Jury would require to Justify
their verdict against him.” 88
Echoing the sentiment expressed by these judges, the early
American judicial system adopted the Whig position regarding the
magnitude and factual accuracy of evidence required to generate an
indictment before a grand jury. The reason for this is because of fear
over the abuse of power; a healthy skepticism regarding the authority
of the Executive branch to charge and prosecute cases against American
citizens. 89A revolutionary war for independence fought over similar
concerns may have influenced American judges to adopt stricter
charging criteria to be certain that the Executive would not abuse its
prosecutorial authority. Once again, Ortman cites the grand jury
instruction language that was invoked by judges in the eastern states,
leaving no doubt about the influence of Whig, and now American
concerns over abuse of power. Specifically, indictments were only to
be decided if the grand jury was “satisfied; well satisfied; fully satisfied;
________________________________
86. Id. at 519.
87. Id. at 531–32.
88. Id. at 532.
89. See David N. Mayer, The English Radical Whig Origins of American
Constitutionalism, 70 WASH. U. L. REV. 131, 138–39 (1992).
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[or] convinced;” when there was “the most unequivocal evidence;
moral certainty; evidence sufficient to convict;” when there were “the
most probable grounds; the strongest appearance of criminality; or
when the grand jury had no reasonable cause of doubt.” 90
To summarize, the founding era judges were keenly aware of the
possibility that the Executive would abuse its power through
prosecutorial misconduct. While this article provides the reader with
current data relating to the wrongful conviction of defendants who were
indicted by a grand jury, but were later proven to be actually innocent,
the founding era concerns over police and prosecutorial overreach were
largely anecdotal. Today, however, legal and social science scholars
have well established the prevalence of police and prosecutorial
misconduct. Furthermore, errors taking place in police forensics
laboratories, reliance upon jailhouse informants, false confessions, false
eyewitness identifications, and inadequate or absent indigent defenses
have also come to light. 91
In 1905, former President of the United States and Chief Justice of
the United States Supreme Court, William Howard Taft, said, “the
administration of the criminal law in all the states of the Union (there
may be one or two exceptions) is a disgrace to our civilization.” 92 Chief
Justice Taft was cited by Justice Frankfurter in his 1952 dissent in
Leland v. Oregon. 93 While Justice Frankfurter modifies Chief Justice
Taft’s tone somewhat, he states that no matter how much things may
have improved in the intervening forty-seven years, “no informed
person can be other than unhappy about the serious defects of presentday American criminal justice.” 94 In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme
Court held that, “[h]owever guilty defendants, upon due inquiry, might
prove to have been, they were, until convicted, presumed to be
innocent.” 95 In a case where the Court zeroed in on assistance of
counsel as instrumental to a fair trial, it made the more general
declaration that, “It was the duty of the court having their cases in
________________________________
90.
91.

Id. at 531.
See generally JAMES R. ACKER & ALLISON D. REDLICH, WRONGFUL
CONVICTION (2011).
92. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802–03 (1952) (Frankfurther, J.,
dissenting).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 802.
95. 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
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charge to see that they were denied no necessary incident of a fair
trial.” 96
A more contemporary exposition of both Chief Justice Taft and
Justice Frankfurter’s assessment of the sad state of American criminal
justice bookends more than a century’s worth of concern for fair
application of due process. 97 It has become apparent that the American
criminal justice system is broken in much the same way that founding
era judges feared it might be. But the difference today is that the
probable cause standard has usurped the far stricter emphasis upon near
certainty of guilt required to indict, and it has done so at precisely the
moment when plea bargaining demands less evidentiary resistance.
By 1978, the principle and evidentiary standards pertaining to
grand jury instructions had substantially changed following publication
of the Federal Judicial Conference’s model grand jury charge. The new
language, which was applied in all courtrooms across the United States,
said: “[Y]our duty [is] to see to it that indictments are returned against
those who you find probable cause to believe are guilty.” 98
Although not discussed, the fact that defendants are indicted based
upon probable cause means they are not being protected by the
Constitution’s Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments. Instead, they
are being convicted based upon an anorexic due process that
significantly increases the likelihood of innocent people being
wrongfully convicted, and where those who may be factually guilty, but
who may be guilty of something other than the facts as alleged, will be
exposed to minimal due process protections. The remainder of this
article will address the presumption of innocence.
IV. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
As indicated in Part I, the majority in Winship referred to the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard as procedural manifestation of
“that bedrock ‘axiomatic and elementary’ principle whose enforcement
lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.” 99 The
Court’s reference to the presumption of innocence was echoed by none
________________________________
96.
97.

Id.
See generally WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (2011).
98. See Ortman, supra note 68, at 520.
99. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
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other than Alexander Hamilton, when he stated that the presumption of
innocence was “a great principle of social security.” 100 And while it
would be reasonable to conclude that the majority of Americans are
familiar with this “axiomatic and bedrock” principle ensconced in
hundreds of years of common law and popular culture, it is doubtful
that those same Americans understand that there is no presumption of
innocence in due process prior to trial. 101
Data collected between June 3 and June 5 of 2013 by the Center for
Prosecutorial Integrity (CPI) on the topic of prosecutorial misconduct
included a question about the presumption of innocence. 102 As with
most treatments of the construct, CPI researchers assumed what they
might well have sought to establish when they asked: “Do you believe
the presumption of innocence is being lost in our nation’s legal
system?” 103 With an average of 993 individuals responding to thirteen
questions with a dichotomous “yes” or “no” answer, the CPI indicates
that 66.8 percent of respondents “think the presumption of innocence is
becoming lost in our nation’s legal system.” 104 It is difficult to deduce
from the CPI data just what the significance of the presumption of
innocence is for most Americans, but the hermeneutic beauty of the
declarative, “presumption of innocence,” is its ontological simplicity
(or so it would seem). I agree with Andrew Ashworth’s conviction that:
The presumption of innocence is a moral and political principle,
based on a widely shared conception of how a free society. . . should
exercise the power to punish. One element in this is the high value
placed on the fundamental right not to be wrongly convicted.
Another element stems from the huge disparity of resources between
the State and defendant. 105
________________________________
100. François Quintard-Morénas, The Presumption of Innocence in The French
and Anglo-American Legal Traditions, 58 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 107, 133 (2010).
101. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
102.
CPI Survey Methods, CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY,
http://www.prosecutor integrity.org/survey-summary/methods/ (last visited Oct. 20,
2017).
103. Id.
104. CPI Survey Highlights, CTR. FOR PROSECUTOR INTEGRITY, http://www.
prosecutorintegrity.org/survey-summary/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2017).
105. Andrew Ashworth, Four Threats to the Presumption of Innocence, 10
INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 241 249–50 (2006).
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While a thorough historical overview of the presumption of
innocence is beyond the scope of this article, it is important to consider
its relevance to the democratic administration of justice in the United
States. 106 This is more than an academic dispute. In a 2016 publication,
the Department of Justice’s Community Oriented Policing Program
(COPS) issued a report titled “A Victim-Centered Approach,”107
suggesting that “[a]gencies should have policies and practices that
ensure victims are treated with respect and care and that victims retain
some sense of control during the criminal justice process.” 108 The
Ashland, Oregon Police Department’s “You Have Options Program” is
highlighted in chapter two of the report. 109 It discusses how the VictimCentered Approach, as one would suppose, is an exemplary way
forward. The substance of the You Have Options Program is constituted
by twenty “elements” that were culled by the Ashland Police
Department from feedback elicited from sexual assault victims to,
“determine what they needed most from law enforcement . . . .” 110 At
issue here is element number seventeen which states:
Investigators will collaborate with victims during the investigative
process and respect a victim’s right to request certain investigative
steps not be conducted. Criminal investigations will be conducted at
a pace set by the victim, not the law enforcement officer. Victims
will be informed that no case can proceed to the arrest or referral to

________________________________
106. Like pleas, pre-trial detention hearings are based upon the probable cause
standard where “all the evidence presented pretrial goes to the merits of the case . . . .
Thus, the defendant quickly gives up her right to due process before a deprivation of
liberty.” Pre-trial detention hearings are precursors to plea bargains. As such, “with
one mini-trial, the defendant loses all opportunities to gain access to the umbrella of
constitutional protections she receives at trial, including the presumption of
innocence.” See Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO
ST. L.J. 723, 754 (2011).
107. U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., OFF. OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.,
IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING GENDER BIAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 9 (2016) [hereinafter COPS], https://riczai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0796-pub.pdf.
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 12–13.
110. Id.
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an office of prosecution until the investigative process is
complete. 111

The report goes on to state that “[f]ollowing the implementation of the
You Have Options Program, the Ashland Police Department saw sexual
assault reporting increase by more than 100 percent.” 112
Authors of the CPI report, Christopher Perry and Richard Davis,
have made the important point that throughout the COPS report,
complainants are referred to as “victims.” 113 This immediately suggests
that a crime has occurred prior to determination by law enforcement. 114
But their most vital concern, as well as mine, is the report’s disregard
for any sense of a presumption of innocence for the accused. Perry and
Davis state:
We agree that trauma-informed interviews, use of victim advocates,
and respectful interactions are essential and should be encouraged.
But “victim-centered investigations,” which explicitly instruct the
officer to believe the complainant, regardless of the circumstances,
should be discouraged because of the likely negative results. Victimcentered investigations represent an approach for complainants that
is built upon a system of injustice for the accused. 115

On a psychological level, nomenclature matters, especially when it
is oxymoronic. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and COPS appear to
recommend an approach to investigation of sexual assault allegations
that is victim-centered, thereby ensconcing the presumption of guilt into
policy. Thus, the nomenclature being adopted by the DOJ and COPS
presumes that a crime has been committed. Unfortunately, that
presumption of guilt will confound law enforcement investigation in
sexual assault allegations, from the initial point of contact with the
________________________________
111. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
113. Letter from Christopher J. Perry, Program Dir., Ctr. for Prosecutor
Integrity, & Richard L. Davis, Former Police Lieutenant, Brockton Police Dep’t, to
Ronald L. Davis, Dir., Office of Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs., & Chuck Wexler,
Exec. Dir., Police Exec. Research Forum (June 6, 2016) (on file with author) (“Finally
instead of ‘complainant,’ the report repeatedly uses the word ‘victim,’ a word that
presumes a crime has occurred, which is not always the case.”).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 2.
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complainant, through prosecutorial filing of formal charges, and to
presentment before a grand jury.
A. Police Misconduct and Wrongful Conviction
From arrest to indictment, pressure is placed upon law enforcement
to make arrests and gain convictions. 116 As early as 1934, John A. Seiff,
publishing on the subject of the presumption of innocence, mentioned
“the tendency to cast a stone whenever an unfortunate is charged with
the commission of an offense either against morals or the law.” 117 He
cautions against willful acceptance of suspect confessions because,
“[t]he source of information is frequently polluted by the zeal of a
police officer twisting every statement into proof of guilt.”118
Contemporary documentation of police misconduct as a principle factor
in causing wrongful convictions appeared in a 2013 Washington
University Law Review article by Professor Russell Covey. 119 Postmortem analysis of exoneration cases to document each of the errors
leading to wrongful convictions appears on both the Innocence
Project 120 and National Registry of Exonerations 121 websites.
Professor Covey addresses the causes of wrongful convictions
arising from two Texas cases—Ramparts and Tulia. 122 He indicates that
these two cases are responsible for as many as two-hundred wrongful
convictions with the primary cause being procedural and substantive
________________________________
116. See Dean Scoville, What’s Really Going on with Crime Rates, POLICE
MAG. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/
2013/10/what-s-really-going-on-with-crime-rates.aspx (discussing the twin practices
of inflating and deflating crime statistics). See also Policing and Profit, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1723 (Apr. 10, 2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/04/policing-andprofit/.
117. John A. Seiff, The Presumption of Innocence, 25 J. OF CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 53, 53 (1934).
118. Id.
119. See Russell Covey, Police Misconduct as a Cause of Wrongful
Convictions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1133 (2013).
120. Government Misconduct, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/causes/government-misconduct/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2017) [hereinafter
INNOCENCE PROJECT].
121. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53.
122. Covey, supra note 119, at 1137–43.
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police perjury. 123 Among the examples of procedural perjury was police
lying about the circumstances of an encounter with a suspect,
specifically, about receiving consent to search, probable cause, and
compliance with constitutional rules like administration of Miranda.124
Substantive perjury refers to incidences where police lie to incriminate
innocent suspects. In both the Ramparts and Tulia cases, Covey reports
that police were found to have planted drugs and weapons, lied about
consent searches, engaged in coercing confessions, and lied about
having probable cause for searches by making “dropsy” cases where
police claimed that drugs or weapons fell from the suspect’s person
thereby appearing in plain view making the evidence admissible. 125
The Innocence Project identifies the following police misconduct
activities as having been associated with the 344 currently documented
DNA exonerations:
(1) Employing suggestion when conducting identification
procedures,
(2) Coercing false confessions,
(3) Lying or intentionally misleading jurors about police
observations of crime scene events,
(4) Failing to turn over exculpatory evidence to prosecutors,
(5) Providing incentives to secure unreliable evidence from
informants. 126
Moreover, prosecutors have engaged in the following forms of
misconduct leading to wrongful convictions:
(1) Withholding exculpatory evidence from the defense,
(2) Deliberately misleading, mistreating or destroying
evidence,
(3) Allowing witnesses that they know or should know are not
truthful to testify,
(4) Pressuring defense witnesses not to testify,
(5) Relying upon fraudulent forensic experts, and
(6) Making misleading arguments that overstate the probative
value of testimony. 127
________________________________
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1158.
See generally Covey, supra note 119.
INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 120.
Id.
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As mentioned in Part III of this article, at the time of its writing, the
National Registry of Exonerations indicates there are 1886 exonerations
in its database. 128 In a report released on September 22, 2016, Kaitlin
Jackson and Samuel Gross presented disturbing data relating to “police
misconduct and tainted identifications.” 129 Of the 1886 exonerations,
30 percent included unintentional identifications. 130 Most importantly,
26 percent of those cases were the result of lies from witnesses who
intentionally identified the wrong person. 131 Other errors pertained to
mistakes made by police officers. The patterns identified by Jackson
and Gross include:
(1) Misidentifications by witnesses who know the suspect, are
generally lies.
(2) Misidentifications by strangers are generally mistakes.
(3) Police initiated identification procedures, generally inperson or photographic lineups, almost always involve
witnesses who are strangers to the suspect.
(4) Police manipulate an eyewitness into mistakenly believing
she saw a suspect she did not actually see.
(5) The police convince the witness that they, the police, know
the suspect is guilty, which may lead the witness to lie and
identify a suspect she does not recognize in order to help
police obtain a conviction.
(6) Some witnesses are induced to lie and identify innocent
suspects out of self-interest: they are promised benefits if
they do, are threatened with harsh consequences if they do
not, or both. 132
Jackson and Gross analyzed 1365 exonerations through April of
2014 and found that some type of false identification existed in 75
percent of these cases. 133 In 57 percent of the tainted identifications
found in this database, the witnesses made mistakes; in 43 percent they
________________________________
128.
129.

NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53.
Kaitlin Jackson & Samuel Gross, Tainted Identifications, NAT’L
REGISTRY
OF
EXONERATIONS
(Sept.
22,
2016),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/taintedids.aspx.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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lied. 134 There are four police practices identified in these case files that
are worth noting, and each generated wrongful convictions of actually
innocent people. These four practices are telling, displaying, repeating,
and lying. 135
Telling refers to police “telling” the witness who to pick out of a
lineup, and this occurred in nearly half of the tainted identification
cases. 136 Jackson and Gross found that 12 percent of the tainted
identifications included situations where “police not only told witnesses
who to identify but threatened those who were reluctant to do so.”137
Displaying refers to the police practice of constructing photo and/or live
arrays in such a way that the suspect is physically unique among others
appearing in the photo array or live lineup. For example, if police first
show a suspect a photo array and follow it with a live lineup, they may
only include one person from the original photo array in the live lineup.
Consequently, this practice draws the witness’s attention to that
particular suspect. Other display tactics police use to make a suspect
standout may include clothing, color versus black and white photos,
facial hair, and the like. Repeating refers to the police practice of
reusing suspects in either a photo array or live lineup after having
already presented a witness with those same suspects, but where the
witness could not initially make a positive identification. Repeating
occurred in 14 percent of the tainted identification cases. Finally, lying
occurred in 7 percent of the tainted identification cases. 138 Specifically,
“police used false information to explain away discrepancies between
the suspect and the eyewitness’s initial description.” 139
This information begs the question of whether a pre-trial
presumption of innocence is necessary. The institutional and subcultural data generated by legal and social science scholars, as well as
the Innocence Project, 140 Innocence Network, 141 and National Registry
________________________________
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. INNOCENCE PROJECT, supra note 120.
141. See generally THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, http://innocencenetwork.org
(last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
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of Exonerations 142 as it pertains to police misconduct would certainly
make it seem so. Would a pre-trial presumption of innocence have a
significant effect upon police misconduct? Not alone. It would serve as
a principle that guides improved police procedure and due process.
However, as the law now stands there is no legal expectation of a pretrial presumption of innocence, and as the data presented above makes
clear, the presumption of guilt that law enforcement operates under
generates severe consequences for the innocent, as well as crippling
systemic legitimacy. As Professor Dworkin proclaimed, actually
innocent people have a fundamental right not to be convicted. 143 In fact,
it is my contention that the United States should consider adopting a
pre-trial presumption of innocence similar to what has been established
by European human rights law, where pre-trial procedures are
conducted, so far as possible, as if the defendant were innocent. 144 This
would require adoption of what Paul Roberts refers to as “the principle
of asymmetry,” where greater weight is placed upon protection of the
innocent through adoption of a presumption of innocence as a matter of
principle. 145
B. Innocent Until Proven Guilty?
Is it truly the case, as many actors within the judicial system claim,
that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty? If so, when
should that presumption attach? For example, we know that the
presumption of innocence does not attach upon arrest, but should it? If
so, how would that manifest? Upon initial contact with law
enforcement? 146 Upon assignment of counsel? Upon initial
appearance? Upon presentment before a grand jury? We may all agree
that once an accused makes an admission or confession to some or all
facts as alleged in an indictment and thereby enters into a guilty plea,
then logically, the accused could no longer be presumed innocent. But
as indicated in Part I above, my concern precedes such an admission or
________________________________
142. NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53.
143. See Ashworth, supra note 105, at 71.
144. Id. at 80.
145. Id. at 73.
146. See Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 189–90 (2013) (holding that a
suspect’s pre-Miranda non-custodial silence may be considered by jurors at trial as an
aggravating factor).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol54/iss1/3

34

Schehr: STANDARD OF PROOF, PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, AND PLEA BARGAINING:
8 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

7/11/2018 11:35 AM

STANDARD OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

85

confession and instead focuses on due process rights accruing to the
accused upon arrest.
C. Brief Historical Account of the Presumption of Innocence
The earliest written reference to the presumption of innocence for
the accused can be found in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi (1792–
1750 BC). 147 Allen H. Godbey says, “it is a fundamental principle of
the code of Hammurabi that the presumption is always in favor of the
innocence of the accused: the burden of proof is thrown upon the
accuser.” 148 In 352 B.C., Greek orator, Demosthenes, stated, “no man
comes under that designation [criminal] until he has been convicted and
found guilty.” 149 King Ptolemy of Egypt (118 B.C.), Roman Emperor’s
Honorius and Theodose (423 A.D.), and French Emperor Charlemagne
each articulated a similar common commitment to the presumption of
innocence for the accused prior to conviction. 150
The maxim: “Innocent until proven guilty,” can be traced to
thirteenth-century France where it is believed that French canonist,
Johannes Monachus, was the first person to coin this phrase. 151 It is
likely that the French people were well-aware of the maxim by the
fourteenth-century, despite frequent egregious violations of it during
the latter Middle Ages. 152 However, in what by contemporary standards
would appear downright progressive, King Louis XVI of France gave
the presumption of innocence his imprimatur when in “his Declaration
of May 1788 [he abolished] the humiliating use of the sellette [a
wooden stool that the accused was forced to sit upon during
questioning], prohibiting that suspects wear prison garb, and imposing
________________________________
147. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi was “developed during the reign of
Hammurabi of the first dynasty of Babylon [and included] penalties for breaking the
laws [that] varied according to the status of the offender and circumstances of the
offense.” Hammurabi’s Code (1792 BC–1750 BC), ONLINE LIBR. OF LIBERTY,
http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/hammurabi-s-code-1792-bc-1750-bc (last visited
Apr. 1, 2018).
148. Quintard-Morénas, supra note 100, at 110, 149 n.20 (quoting Allen H.
Godbey, The Place of the Code of Hammurabi, 15 THE MONIST 199, 210 (1905)).
149. Id. at 112 (quoting DEMOSTHENES, AGAINST MEIDIAS, ANDROTION,
ARISTOCRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON 231 (J.H. Vince trans., 1935)).
150. Id. at 112–14.
151. Id. at 114.
152. Id. at 115.
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the publication of judgments of acquittal to reinstate accused
individuals in the public opinion.” 153 In eighteenth-century France, the
presumption of innocence was premised upon a commitment to treat
the accused with humanity, which was a concept that also appeared in
the Declaration of the Rights of Man. 154 Finally, by the end of the
eighteenth-century in Scotland, the presumption of innocence was
adopted as an aspect of Natural Law. 155
D. The Presumption of Innocence in the United States
There is no specific mention of a presumption of innocence in the
United States Constitution. However, case law has identified three
distinct locations articulating the spirit of the presumption: the Fifth
Amendment’s right to remain silent, the Sixth Amendment’s right to a
jury trial, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. 156 The
Supreme Court first implemented the presumption of innocence into
United States law in its opinion in Coffin v. United States. 157
The Coffin case presents a fifty count indictment against Theodore
P. Haughey, Francis A. Coffin, Percival B. Coffin, and Albert S. Reed,
for “wrongfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and willfully misapply[ing]
the moneys, funds and credits of said association [Indianapolis National
Bank] as aforesaid, to wit, the sum of six thousand three hundred and
eighteen dollars.” 158 In an otherwise undifferentiated misdemeanor
bank fraud case, Coffin is recognized for being the first acknowledged
Supreme Court affirmation of the presumption of innocence. The Court
commences its articulation of the presumption of innocence in response
to the forty-fourth charge presented in the Coffin appeal. In question,
was a jury instruction that failed to specifically reference the
________________________________
153. Id. at 122 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 122–23 (“Every man being presumed innocent until he has been
found guilty, if it shall be deemed absolutely necessary to arrest him, every kind of
rigor used, not necessary to secure his person, ought to be severely repressed by the
law.”).
155. See id. at 132.
156. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478 (1978) (as to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process clause).
157. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 452 (1895).
158. Id. at 436.
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presumption of innocence. 159 The language used by the judge in the
Coffin, emphasized the necessity for jurors to reach a guilty verdict only
if they were convinced by the evidence that the defendants were guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. 160 Justice White’s opinion reversed the trial
court’s jury instruction because of its failure to include the
“presumption of innocence” element as requested by the defendants. 161
The Court could have stopped there, but it did not.
The greater proportion of the Coffin opinion is dedicated to a
lengthy exposition regarding the presumption of innocence. It
commences its presumption of innocence commentary with the now
famous affirmation: “The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.” 162 From there, Justice White
launches into a historical contextualization of the presumption of
innocence that has, despite its critics, been fundamental to the principle
ever since. 163 Justice White begins by citing to Simon Greenleaf’s
________________________________
159. Id. at 452 (“The law presumes that persons charged with crime are
innocent until they are proven, by competent evidence, to be guilty. To the benefit of
this presumption the defendants are all entitled, and this presumption stands as their
sufficient protection, unless it has been removed by evidence proving their guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
160. In Coffin, the Supreme Court concluded that, “Before you can find any
one of the defendants guilty, you must be satisfied of his guilt, as charged in some of
the counts of the indictment, beyond a reasonable doubt.” The judge continued by
elaborating upon the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by instructing jurors
as to what “reasonable doubt” would entail: “A ‘reasonable doubt,’ as that term is
employed in the administration of the criminal law, is an honest, substantial
misgiving, generated by the proof, or the want of it. It is such a state of the proof as
fails to convince your judgment and conscience and satisfy your reason of the guilt of
the accused.” Id. at 452–53.
161. Id. at 463; see also Bruce A. Antkowiak, The Irresistible Force, 18 TEMP.
POL. & C.R. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008).
162. Id. at 453.
163. See James Bradley Thayer, The Presumption of Innocence in Criminal
Cases, 6 YALE L.J. 185 (1897). Thayer challenges the notion that the presumption of
innocence should be viewed as evidence weighing in favor of the accused, rather than
as a principle embedded in the Common Law rule pertaining to guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. “There is no need to trace it further, for no one doubts that in one
form or another this has always continued to be a great and recognized rule. It has, in
our inherited system, a peculiarly important function, that of warning our untrained
tribunal, the jury, against being misled by suspicion, conjecture and mere appearances.
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publication, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence. 164 According to Justice
White, Greenleaf identifies the origins of the presumption of innocence
as appearing in ancient Sparta and Athens. 165 Justice White then cites
to Roman law saying, “Let all accusers understand that they are not to
prefer charges unless they can be proven by proper witnesses or by
conclusive documents, or by circumstantial evidence which amounts to
indubitable proof and is clearer than day.” 166 Roman emperor Trajan is
reported to have written to Julius Frontonus that, “no man should be
condemned on a criminal charge in his absence, because it was better
to let the crime of a guilty person go unpunished than to condemn the
innocent.” 167 Justice White continues by pointing out that in 1678 Lord
Hale said:
In some cases presumptive evidence goes far to prove a person
guilty, though there be no express proof of the fact to be committed
by him; but then it must be very warily pressed, for it is better five
guilty persons should escape unpunished than one innocent person
should die. 168

Hale’s maxim is followed by Blackstone’s, which doubles the number
of guilty we’d prefer to see released than to convict one innocent
person. 169 He also references “McKinley’s” case from 1817, where an
incredulous Lord Gillies stated:
But the presumption in favor of innocence is not to be reargued [to
prove wrong or invalid] by mere suspicion. I am sorry to see, in this
________________________________
In saying that the accused person shall be proved guilty, it says also that he shall not
be presumed guilty; that he shall be convicted only upon legal evidence, not tried upon
prejudice; that he shall not be made the victim of the circumstances of suspicion which
surround him, the effect of which it is always so difficult to shake off . . . that after an
investigation by the grand jury he has been indicted, imprisoned, seated in the
prisoner’s dock, carried away handcuffed, isolated, watched, made an object of
distrust to all that behold him.” Id. at 196.
164. Coffin, 156 U.S. at 454.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Code, L. IV, T. XX, 1, 1. 25).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 456.
169. Id. (“The law holds that it is better that ten guilty persons escape than that
one innocent suffer.”).
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information, that the public prosecutor treats this too lightly. He
seems to think that the law entertains no such presumption of
innocence. I cannot listen to this. I conceive that this presumption is
to be found in every code of law which has reason and religion and
humanity for a foundation. It is a maxim which ought to be inscribed
in indelible characters in the heart of every judge and juryman, and I
was happy to hear from Lord Hermand he is inclined to give full
effect to it. 170

Justice White’s exegesis suggests that there is no known reference
in the United States to the presumption of innocence until the
publication of McNally’s Evidence in 1802. 171 He contends that this is
likely due to the ubiquitous American awareness of the principle, and
therefore it was not necessary to overtly discuss it. 172 He also cites to a
statement made in an 1889 publication in Criminal Law Magazine:
“The practice of stating this principle to juries is so nearly universal that
very few cases are found where error has been assigned upon the failure
or refusal of a judge to do so.” 173
The Justice White opinion has drawn considerable debate over its
contention that “the presumption of innocence is evidence in favor of
the accused, introduced by the law in his behalf (emphasis added),”174
instead of serving as a guiding principle signifying proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. But for the Court in Coffin, the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard owes its origin to the ancient Greek and
Roman expression of the presumption of innocence that privileged
“their devotion to human liberty and individual rights.” 175 In perhaps
his strongest statement in defense of retaining the presumption of
innocence as an evidentiary element, Justice White stated:
The inevitable tendency to obscure the results of a truth, when the
truth itself is forgotten or ignored, admonishes that the protection of

________________________________
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
189–90.
175.

Id.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 458.
Id. at 460. For later criticism of this point, see Thayer, supra note 163, at
Id.
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so vital and fundamental a principle as the presumption of innocence
be not denied, when requested, to any one accused of a crime. 176

So ends the Coffin opinion and its unequivocal support for the
presumption of innocence. With the exception of the Court’s defense of
the presumption of innocence as evidence in favor of the accused (a
point taken up only two years later by the Supreme Court in Agnew v.
United States 177) the full-throated defense of the presumption of
innocence in Coffin would stand as prevailing law until 1979 when the
Court confronted the question in the case of Bell v. Wolfish.178
However, two cases preceding Bell are each worth mentioning for
immediate historical context.
In Estelle v. Williams, 179 the United States Supreme Court
addressed the question as to whether an accused who was standing trial
before a jury, and who was presented in court wearing prison clothes,
amounted to a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights pertaining to the presumption of innocence. 180 The greater
proportion of the Court’s opinion stresses the importance of the
presumption of innocence by citing Coffin. The Court acknowledges
the probity of adhering to the presumption of innocence going so far as
to assert:
[T]hat compelling the accused to stand trial in jail garb operates
usually against only those who cannot post bail prior to trial. Persons
who can secure release are not subjected to this condition. To impose
the condition on one category of defendants, over objection, would
be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment (citation omitted). 181
________________________________
176. Id.
177. See 165 U.S. 36, 52 (1897) (holding similarly to Coffin regarding the
centrality of the presumption of innocence, but with the one significant exception
being its rejection of the opinion that the presumption of innocence should be
considered evidence in favor of the accused).
178. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
179. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
180. Id. at 502 (“We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether an
accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury is
denied due process or equal protection of the laws.”).
181. Id. at 505–06.
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Here, the Court clearly seems to recognize the symbolic significance of
a defendant being presented before a jury in prison clothes thereby
indicating guilt. Despite its obvious commitment to the presumption of
innocence in principle, the majority held in favor of the state. 182
A far stronger assertion of the principle and constitutional verity of
the presumption of innocence can be found in the Supreme Court’s
1978 opinion in Taylor v. Kentucky. 183 In Taylor, the Court cites to
Estelle by emphasizing that, “the presumption of innocence, although
not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial
under our system of criminal justice.” 184 At issue in Taylor was a
request by the defendant to have the trial judge include a presumption
of innocence statement along with recitation of the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, which the judge refused. 185 Additionally, in
its opening and closing statements, the prosecution referred to the fact
that by virtue of simply being arrested, indicted, and appearing in court
as a defendant, the jury was permitted “to draw inferences of guilt.”186
For the Court, this was a bridge too far. Important to note, in its opinion
the Court dismissed an attempt by the Commonwealth of Kentucky to
argue that precedent from another case, Howard v. Fleming, 187 “does
not require instructions on the presumption of innocence.” 188 Rather,
the Court clarified the Howard opinion (and by extension Agnew), to
mean that the presumption of innocence instruction may not include
reference to the presumption being considered as evidence in favor of
the accused. 189
________________________________
182. Id. at 510. Here, the majority contended that while it may often be
inappropriate for the defendant to appear before a jury wearing prison clothes, there
may be times when it serves the defendant’s interests to do so. But because there was
no objection by defense counsel to his client being presented at trial wearing prison
clothes, the Court concluded that there was no evidence that “non-bailed defendants
were compelled to stand trial in prison garments if timely objection was made to the
trial judge.”
183. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
184. Id. at 479 (citing Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503).
185. Id. at 490.
186. Id. at 487.
187. 191 U.S. 126 (1903).
188. Taylor, 436 U.S. at 489–90.
189. Id. at 490.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2018

41

California Western Law Review, Vol. 54 [2018], No. 1, Art. 3
Schehr camera ready (Do Not Delete)

92

CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

7/11/2018 11:35 AM

[Vol. 55

A trial judge may, however, issue a presumption of innocence
instruction that intersects with the rule established in Winship, requiring
that jurors must consider whether each of the elements in the case have
met evidentiary standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.190
Therefore, in Taylor, the Supreme Court once again affirmed the
centrality of the presumption of innocence as manifested in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process and fundamental fairness
clauses. However, in an about face occurring only one year later in the
case of Bell v. Wolfish, 191 the Supreme Court would severely limit the
presumption of innocence.
At issue in Bell were questions pertaining to whether various
aspects of pre-trial detention violated the defendant’s presumption of
innocence. 192 Citing Coffin, Taylor, Estelle, and Winship, the Court
acknowledges the centrality of the presumption of innocence as an
aspect of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 193 But without citing to any
legal authority, the Court then truncates the presumption by asserting
that “it has no application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial
detainee during confinement before his trial has even begun.” 194 This
means that there is no presumption of innocence prior to trial.
Commenting on the Bell opinion in an article addressing the origins of
the presumption of innocence in both civil and common law, QuintardMorénas states that:
The one-dimensional conception of the presumption of innocence
endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1979 [Bell v. Wolfish], is
more than a departure from the Anglo-American tradition. It
challenges the very foundation of a social contract in which society,
by prohibiting private vengeance and guaranteeing the right to be
tried by an impartial jury, acknowledges that there is a time for
innocence and a time for guilt. 195

The question then becomes, to presume or to hold? The question over
whether the presumption of innocence should be tied to a law of proof,
________________________________
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Id. at 523.
Id. at 533.
Id.
Quintard-Morénas, supra note 100, at 109.
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or, as Natural Law theorists and judges would have it, be returned to its
substantive meaning from antiquity, is intriguing. It is not just a matter
of semantics either. In People v. Gazulis 196 the Court held that, “[i]t is,
perhaps, unfortunate that the ‘presumption of innocence’ is loosely
referred to by the judiciary and the bar as a ‘presumption;’ it is all of
that and more . . . . The ‘presumption’ of innocence is a substantive
right and not a procedural or evidentiary rule.” 197 It is my belief that
this opinion was shared by Justices Stevens and Brennan in their Bell
dissent:
An empirical judgment that most persons formally accused of
criminal conduct are probably guilty would provide a rational basis
for a set of rules that treat them like convicts until they establish their
innocence. No matter how rational such an approach might be no
matter how acceptable in a community where equality of status is the
dominant goal – it is obnoxious to the concept of individual freedom
protected by the Due Process clause (emphasis added). 198

Striking at the heart of the point being advanced in this article, the
dissenters conclude by saying, “In sum, although there may be some
question as to what it means to treat a person as if he was guilty, there
can be no dispute that the government may never do so at any point in
advance of conviction.” 199 Although dissenting opinions are not legal
authority, it is clear from the preceding case law that the dissenters got
it right. That said, the 1970s ended with a significantly revised
interpretation of the presumption of innocence that limits its protections
solely to trial.
After the Bell opinion, we know that no presumption of innocence
prior to trial exits. We can now answer the questions posed at the
beginning of this section by concluding that there is no presumption of
innocence upon arrest, upon assignment of counsel, or through the
grand jury indictment process leading up to the decision to plead not
guilty and proceed to trial, or even at the commencement of guilty plea
negotiations. Recall for a moment my contention that the administration
of justice in the United States is a two-tiered system of rights
________________________________
196.
197.
198.
199.

People v. Gazulis, 212 N.Y.S.2d 910, 943 (N.Y. City Ct. 1961).
Quintard-Morénas, supra note 100, at 110 n.347.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 579 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 599.
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protections. The first tier is that significant constitutional protections
are afforded to those who plead not guilty and go to trial; these people
will subsequently be cloaked in the lingua franca of presumed
innocence. The second is for those who never realize the presumption
of innocence because they interrupt the flow of constitutional
protections by ending the process with a guilty plea. This is because for
those who waive their right to trial, from arrest through indictment and
admission or confession, there is only the presumption of guilt.
Accordingly, I am in complete agreement with Bell dissenters,
Justices Stevens and Brennan, in their conclusion that:
An empirical judgment that most persons formally accused of
criminal conduct are probably guilty would provide a rational basis
for a set of rules that treat them like convicts until they establish their
innocence. No matter how rational such an approach might be, no
matter how acceptable in a community where equality of status is the
dominant goal – it is obnoxious to the concept of individual freedom
protected by the Due Process Clause. If ever accepted in this country,
it would work a fundamental change in the character of our free
society. 200

But this presumption of guilt is precisely what is imposed upon every
person accused of a crime from arrest through indictment. The Court’s
opinion in Bell flies in the face of historical precedent. Even as far back
as 1764, Cesare Beccaria declared:
No man can be judged a criminal until he be found guilty; nor can
society take from him the public protection until it have been proved
that he has violated the conditions on which it was granted. What
right, then, but that of power, can authorise the punishment of a
citizen so long as there remains any doubt of his guilt? This dilemma
is frequent. Either he is guilty, or not guilty. If guilty, he should only
suffer the punishment ordained by the laws, and torture becomes
useless, as his confession is unnecessary, if he be not guilty, you
torture the innocent; for, in the eye of the law, every man is innocent
whose crime has not been proved. 201
________________________________
200. Id. at 579.
201. Cesare Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishments: Of Torture,
CONSTITUTION.ORG, http://www.constitution.org/cb/crim_pun.htm (last visited Sept.
1, 2017).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol54/iss1/3

44

Schehr: STANDARD OF PROOF, PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, AND PLEA BARGAINING:
8 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

7/11/2018 11:35 AM

STANDARD OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

95

“Axiomatic” is how the Winship Court referred to the presumption of
innocence. 202 And despite the Bell Court’s contention that it only
applies at trial, it is still the case that, “the presumption of innocence is,
along with its sister, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Holy Grail
of the criminal justice system,” 203 and a “cornerstone of Justice in
Western Civilization.” 204
Based on his personal experience, Judge Mark W. Bennett, a
veteran district court judge for the Northern District of Iowa, concluded
that most jurors have no idea what the presumption of innocence
actually means. 205 For example, Judge Bennett cites his attempts as a
young trial court judge in the mid-1990s to discern the extent to which
prospective jurors understood the presumption. He began by asking the
jurors to take a good look at the defendant and tell him whether they
(the jurors) believed defendant was guilty. 206 Jurors routinely
responded by saying, “I have no idea, I haven’t heard any of the
evidence yet.” 207 For Judge Bennett, this experiment with jurors was
chilling because it was clear to him that they did not have any
understanding of the pre-trial presumption of innocence. 208
Consequently, Judge Bennett now explains to jurors that:
[T]he presumption of innocence is so important that it applies in
every criminal case from Maine to California and Hawaii to Florida.
It applies in all 94 federal district courts and all state courts. The
presumption, and “reasonable doubt”. . . are, for my money, the two
most important concepts in the American judicial system. 209

Perhaps most efficacious and visually dramatic, Judge Bennett goes
further by explaining to jurors that the presumption of innocence is “a
steel curtain that surrounds the accused . . . . The presumption
________________________________
202. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
203. Judge Mark W. Bennett, The Presumption of Innocence and Trial Court
Judges: Our Greatest Failing, THE CHAMPION 18 (Apr. 2015).
204. Joseph C. Cascarelli, Presumption of Innocence and Natural Law:
Machiavelli and Aquinas, AM. J. OF JURIS. 229, 231 (1996).
205. Bennett, supra note 203, at 18.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 19.
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surrounds the accused throughout the entire trial . . . . I explain that the
presumption may, all by itself, be sufficient to find the accused not
guilty.” 210 I share this recitation of Judge Bennett’s experiences and his
thoughtful approach to educating jurors and discerning whether jurors
actually understand the presumption of innocence, because Judge
Bennett is applying the lessons he learned to the trial.
Even at trial, with its constitutional protections and application of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is not clear whether jurors properly
adopt the presumption of innocence. Similar findings were reported in
a much more substantial study conducted by Mitchell J. Frank and
Dawn Broschard. 211 In their study of actual jurors, Frank and Broschard
had the members respond to a statement, such as, “I believed
throughout the entire trial that the defendant was presumed
innocent.” 212 The results of this poll were described by Frank and
Broschard as “disturbing.” 213 “Out of 564 responding criminal jurors,
more than one in five, 21.1%, disagreed with this most fundamental
protection. Of equal importance—some may say it is greater—fewer
than one in four jurors, 24.3%, ‘agreed strongly’ with it.” 214
It is clear that Judge Bennett takes the presumption of innocence at
trial very seriously. Let us juxtapose his approach to the one that was
applied to the Boston Marathon bombing case. 215 In that case, which
took place on April 15, 2013, prospective jurors were provided with a
101 question questionnaire. 216 One of the questions asked jurors
whether they believed that Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of the two people
accused of the Boston Marathon bombing, was guilty. 217 According to
Masha Gessen writing for the The New Yorker, most believed that he

________________________________
210. Id.
211. Mitchell J. Frank & Dawn Broschard, The Silent Criminal Defendant and
the Presumption of Innocence: In the Hands of Real Jurors, is Either of them Safe?,
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 237, 260 (2006).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. In re Tsarnaev, 780 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2015).
216. Id. at 35.
217. Id.
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was guilty. 218 While this is not surprising given the media attention
directed at the case, the judge’s response during voir dire when
questioned about whether a proper presumption of innocence
instruction was being delivered to prospective jurors is troubling.
According to Gessen, “[t]he judge sided with the prosecution, saying
that ‘presumption of innocence’ is ‘a term of art’ that does not actually
mean presuming the innocence of a defendant.” 219 So, even in a high
profile trial like Tsarnaev’s, the judge diminished the presumption to
little more than a rhetorical tool. However, it may be that this response
is an outlier and that most judges adopt the more historically
conventional application of the presumption of innocence as an aspect
of a proof beyond a reasonable doubt finding.
In his application of Natural Law to the presumption of innocence
and the “knock and announce rule,” Joseph Cascarelli seems to suggest
that the presumption must attach prior to trial. 220 For example,
application of the “knock and announce rule” 221 requires police officers
with a warrant to “knock and announce” their presence prior to entering
a home. 222 This is because, according to Cascarelli, the law first
________________________________
218. Masha Gessen, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and the Presumption of Innocence,
THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/newsdesk/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-presumption-innocence.
219. Id.
220. Cascarelli, supra note 204, at 267.
221. The probity of the knock and announce rule was upheld in Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). At issue in Hudson was whether evidence gathered
in violation of the knock and announce rule should be excluded. In a 5–4 opinion with
Justice Scalia writing for the majority, the Court held that knocking and announcing
and only waiting for three to five seconds before entering amounted to a Fourth
Amendment violation. However, the majority also held that the evidence seized could
be introduced at trial. Why? For Justice Scalia, the knock and announce rule spoke to
a specific set of values—“the lives, safety, and dignity of the inhabitants and the
protection of property.” The knock and announce rule did not prohibit police officers
from seeing and seizing evidence that was identified for seizure in the search warrant.
See ZALMAN, supra note 24, at 74. What is primarily at issue for me is Justice Scalia’s
reference to the life, safety, and dignity of the suspects who are the subjects of the
warrant. Those values are consistent with the presumption of innocence, especially in
a Natural Law context.
222. However, drug interdiction cases have increasingly led to no-knock
warrants if police officers believe that the items they are looking for may be destroyed,
or if by knocking in advance there may be a threat to police officer safety. See Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995) (where the Supreme Court held that exceptions
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presumes that people are law abiding citizens. 223 Cascarelli cites to Kerr
v. State of California 224 and the specific reference to the presumption
of innocence articulated by Justice William Brennan:
The first is that any exception not requiring a showing of such
awareness [of police officer’s presence by the occupants of the
home] necessarily implies a rejection of the inviolable presumption
of innocence. 225

How does Justice Brennan’s “inviolable presumption of innocence”
explain police practices that clearly fly in the face of it? Is it true, as
Quintard-Morénas suggests, that “[a]ll too often suspects are treated as
guilty by a society that owes them protection, even in light of the
appalling nature of the alleged crime[?]” 226 After all,
Police are trained to act on a presumption of guilt in ways that
exacerbate natural tendencies toward confirmation bias. Police are
trained, for example, to make quick assessments of guilt and to
interrogate suspects, not to learn information about the case, but to
obtain a confession that confirms their suspicions.227

It seems, therefore, that the presumption of guilt and not the
presumption of innocence initiates the criminal investigation process.
There can be little doubt that in order for law enforcement to
investigate cases of alleged harm, it must in some way be legally
permitted to detain suspects for questioning. However, there is an
important caveat to this principle. Law enforcement should be required
to take extreme steps, consistent with the historical presumption of
________________________________
to knock and announce included: a threat of physical violence; a suspect escapes from
an officer and retreats to his dwelling; a demand to open the door is refused; and there
is reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were
given).
223. Cascarelli, supra note 204, at 266.
224. Kerr v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 56 (1963).
225. Cascarelli, supra note 204, at 267 (quoting Kerr v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 56 (1963)).
226. Quintard-Morénas, supra note 100, at 109.
227. Keith Findley, The Presumption of Innocence Exists in Theory, Not
Reality, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/intheory/wp/2016/01/19/the-presumption-of-innocence-exists-in-theory-not-reality/.
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innocence discussed above, to ensure that suspects’ reputations are not
tarnished by either the arrest or the investigation.
Let us consider one of the conditions under which a suspect may be
properly detained. Suspects may be detained by law enforcement for
questioning, “ensuring a person’s attendance at trial, safeguarding the
judicial process from interference by a defendant, and protecting the
security of the facility if a defendant is detained.” 228 Most important,
and consistent with historical invocations of the presumption of
innocence, the state must be committed to ensuring that the reputation
of the accused is preserved. This may be accomplished by seeking as a
matter of policy to make suspect arrests outside the public eye and
thereby avoiding the proverbial “perp walk.” 229 But that is just the
beginning. Clearly, as referenced above, law enforcement strategies
designed to procure confessions based upon presumptions of guilt
violate not only their truth-seeking and evidence gathering functions,
but also may lead to wrongfully convicting the innocent. 230 Once again,
the literature addressing each of the known correlates pertaining to
wrongful conviction is extensive. But it is clear that for law
enforcement the pressure to arrest, tunnel vision, destruction of
evidence, the pressure to induce confessions, reliance upon inaccurate
eyewitness identification procedures, and reliance upon faulty forensic
practices have each been identified with wrongful conviction. 231 As it
pertains to the presumption of innocence, and assurances regarding the
________________________________
228. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST.
L.J. 723, 768 (2011).
229. Id. at 768–69.
230. For several examples of false confessions leading to wrongful convictions,
see TRUE STORIES OF FALSE CONFESSIONS (Rob Warden & Steven A. Drizin eds.,
2009). See also ACKER & REDLICH, supra note 91; BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING
THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (2011); DAN SIMON,
IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012); Hannah
Laqueur, Stephen Rushin & Jonathan Simon, Wrongful Conviction, Policing, and the
“Wars on Crime and Drugs,” in EXAMINING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 92–107
(Allison D. Redlich et al. eds., 2014).
231. For a detailed set of exoneration cases and causes, see NAT’L REGISTRY
OF EXONERATIONS, supra note 53. Out of 2110 exonerations since 1989, the Registry
identifies as the leading causes of wrongful conviction, in order of prevalence: perjury
or false accusation, official misconduct, mistaken eyewitness identification, false or
misleading forensic evidence, and false confession.
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reliability of evidence procured, 232 much could be gained by changing
police sub-culture to: (a) avoid tunnel vision, (b) alter police
interrogation methods, (c) improve eyewitness identification
procedures to avoid biasing witnesses consistent with police
assumptions, (d) changing criminal procedure so that police are no
longer permitted to lie to suspects about evidence against them, 233 (e)
changing criminal procedure so that suspects are permitted to have legal
representation present for photographic eyewitness identification
procedures, 234 and (f) changing criminal procedure to severely limit the
use of showups. 235 Another alarming trend is that now law enforcement
may not only deduce from a suspect’s pre-Mirandized, non-custodial
silence that she or he is guilty, but that silence may now be used by
________________________________
232. My thanks to Professor Christopher Slobogin for emphasizing the
difference between what must be required of law enforcement when it comes to
preserving the presumption of innocence, and those procedural activities necessary to
procure reliable evidence necessary to establish proof of guilt. The point that I am
attempting to make here is that if law enforcement adopts the presumption of
innocence upon arrest, that ethic will stimulate enhanced procedural controls
necessary for the generation of valid and reliable evidence.
233. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).
234. Current law restricts suspect access to assigned counsel to live lineups.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Supreme Court denied the right to
the presence of assigned counsel during police presentation of a photo array to an
eyewitness in the case of United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973). Given the
ubiquity of photo arrays, and what is known about the procedural errors that may
occur if photo arrays are not properly administered, this is a matter that should return
to the Supreme Court for reconsideration.
235. Wrongful conviction scholarship has influenced new state criminal
procedure by confronting the serious shortcomings expressed in the Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188 (1972) and Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) totality of the
circumstances test. As early as 1986 the state of Utah’s Supreme Court held in State
v. Long that, “several of the [Biggers/Brathwaite] criteria listed by the Court are based
on assumptions that are flatly contradicted by well-respected and essentially
unchallenged empirical studies.” State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986).
Perhaps the most comprehensive overhaul of a state eyewitness identification
procedure has taken place in the state of New Jersey. In State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d
872 (2011), the New Jersey Supreme Court significantly modified its state eyewitness
identification procedures based upon current science. Beginning with Part III of its
opinion, “Proof of Misidentifications,” and continuing with Part V, “Scope of
Scientific Research,” the Court iterates in methodical fashion the most current
eyewitness identification scholarship.
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prosecutors as incriminating evidence. 236 Were the presumption of
innocence to carry any pre-trial weight this kind of Supreme Court
opinion, apparently predicated upon enhancing police investigation and
prosecutorial powers, would be viewed as unprincipled and dangerous.
V. CONCLUSION
As a hegemonic practice, plea bargaining is ubiquitous. It meets
systemic needs for efficiency and the preservation of scarce local
resources that otherwise would be dedicated to preparation for, and
administration of, trials. But is this legally rational and cost-benefitting
institutional remedy the most principled way to manifest the
administration of justice in a democratic state?
This article sets out to address two fundamental principles directly
affecting plea convictions—the standard of proof required for
indictment, and the presumption of innocence. As discussed, the ease
with which prosecutors procure indictments in grand jury states,
accompanied by the lack of a robust pre-trial presumption of innocence,
increases the likelihood of wrongful conviction. Contemporary criminal
procedure must return to the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
to indict as originally adopted by our founding judges, out of concern
for and for precisely the same reason discussed in this article. 237 Judicial
________________________________
236. See Salinas v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 188–90 (2013).
237. In two compelling papers, Professor Slobogin argues for adoption of what
he refers to as “Hybrid-Inquisitorialism” to replace our current retributive adversarial
plea system. Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining and the Substantive and
Procedural Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Adversarialism to
Preventative Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub.
Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 15–4, 2015); Christopher Slobogin,
Lessons from Inquisitorialism (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law and Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 13–36, 2013). Each paper provides detailed application
of a hybrid-inquisitorial model that would in many ways provide enhanced due
process protections. I consider Professor Slobogin’s hybrid-inquisitorial model as
complementary to the argument made in this article, in that Professor Slobogin shares
many of the same concerns over the lack of the presumption of innocence,
prosecutorial control over adversarial due process, and the ambiguous Rule 11
“factual basis” conviction language. In particular, in Lessons from Inquisitorialism,
supra at 23, Slobogin suggests that “[i]n an inquisitorial regime, the judge would have
an obligation to conduct an independent investigation of facts relevant to sentencing,
whether that investigation takes place during a plea hearing or at a separate sentencing
proceeding.” A judge’s involvement with factual determinations regarding defendant
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concerns about prosecutorial overreach that were common at our
founding were primarily driven by our American experiences with
England. Today, legal and social science scholars have generated
comprehensive assessments of the causes and correlates producing
wrongful convictions of actually innocent men and women. Americans
are no longer a colonized people concerned about abuses of
monarchical power. However, the modern American justice system is
fraught with recognized pre-trial errors of omission and commission.
These errors highlight the concerns expressed by President Taft, Justice
Frankfurter, and William Stuntz, each of whom were cited in this
Article as viewing the American criminal justice system as being in
serious need of resuscitation.
It is true that plea bargaining is an important instrument of state
authority necessary to efficiently process felony criminal cases and has
hegemonic ubiquity throughout the system. However, it is apparent to
me that the failure of both Supreme Court case law, and
Congressionally generated federal rules legitimating pleas, has created
a shadow administration of justice that is anything but just. As a nation,
we valorize a system of due process that affords rights protections
accruing to defendants who elect to plead not guilty and go to trial. Yet
there remains the presumption of guilt from arrest through indictment,
and the opaque exercise of prosecutorial authority that constitutes 95 to
97 percent of all felony convictions procured by way of the plea.
Viewed in this context, Federal Rule 11 with its “rational” colloquy
ostensibly designed to assure the court, and serve as a palliative to the
public, that a defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily,
in addition to the requirement that pleas must possess a “factual basis”
(not yet clearly defined by either a court or the United States Congress),
is a tissue-thin cloak to legitimate what is otherwise a severe usurpation
of the protection of liberty interests that in a democracy, must be
paramount.

________________________________
guilt would, in my view, enhance both the presumption of innocence and enhance the
validity, reliability, and quantum of proof necessary to meet the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. On this last point Professor Slobogin and I would likely
part company, as I have not read that he would support the enhanced burden of proof
that I am suggesting here that would be required to return a true bill. See Plea
Bargaining and Lessons from Inquisitorialism, supra.
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